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The Real Estate Brokerage Industry
and Antitrust Implications
I. INTRODUCTION
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or
in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consis-
tent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing
to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.
-Adam Smith
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 1
The impact of the real estate industry, as a whole, upon the na-
tional economy is of major proportions. Everyone needs a place
to live, and, for most people, the purchase of a home is the most
significant investment they will ever make.2
Seemingly, one of the first areas to be affected by the tightening
of the money supply or recessive financial trends is the construc-
tion industry.3 The consumer's inability to borrow money at af-
fordable rates in order to purchase a new or "resale" home, often
results in a decrease in demand for new housing. In contrast, rel-
atively low interest rates result in high demand for housing.
Homes purchased under the latter circumstances are often con-
sidered as both investment opportunities and family residences.
The increasing mobility of our society and the general population
growth have been major contributing factors in the increase of the
housing demand, and consequently, in the increasing cost of
housing itself. The sale or purchase of most homes involves the
service of a real estate broker. Most real estate brokers operate
on a commission basis, and, hence, strong incentive exists for
them to work hard to maximize their profits.
Economic principles form the foundation of antitrust laws,4 the
1. I A. SmrrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, C. X (1776).
2. For example, in 1975, over 33% of total credit extended in the U.S. was for
real estate loans; compare with 18.8% of credit utilized for the federal debt. HOAG-
LAND, STONE & BRUEGGEMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 3844 (1977).
3. First quarter reports of 1980 evidenced a drop of new housing starts by
22%.
4. The federal antitrust statutes are found in three main acts: the Sherman
Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209; the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15
objectives of which are to assure a competitive economy. "From
the very beginning, antitrust ... was considered a bulwark
against arbitrary action and oppression at the hands of the eco-
nomically powerful ... ."5 The underlying theory is that through
a truly competitive marketplace, the lowest price will be found for
goods to satisfy consumer wants while, at the same time, preserv-
ing scarce resources as best as possible. Such a system suggests
that the "consumer (through his willingness or refusal to buy)
will decide what and how much shall be produced and that com-
petition among producers (with the production of the highest
quality product at the lowest price) will determine who will man-
ufacture it."6 It would appear that this economic goal is some-
what thwarted when the providers of services who are supposed
U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1976) with particular provisions often identified themselves for
the specific area of antitrust activity codified: the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592,
§§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976)) (price
discimination); and the Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976)) (corporate mergers)); and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
The scope of issues to be dealt with herein invoke only consideration of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 45(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976), states that "[ujnfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are declared unlawful." The real estate business in California is cur-
rently under investigation by the Federal Trade Commission, presumably under
the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1976). A report was expected June, 1980. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of felony, [punishable by fines
and imprisonment] ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Prior to recent amendment, penalty for violation was only a
misdemeanor.
Several states have enacted state antitrust statutes ("little Sherman Acts")
which by case decision have been held to parallel the federal law. Thus, federal
case decisions and precedents have been held to be applicable by analogy. See
Cartwright Act § 1, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980); Illi-
nois Antitrust Act 1965 Ill. Laws, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to 60-11 (Smith-
Hurd 1961 & Supp. 1980); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 445.701 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56:9-1 to 9-19 (West Supp. 1980). For state court cases holding federal cases in-
terpreting the Sherman Act to be persuasive authority: see, e.g., Marin County Bd.
of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 925, 549 P.2d 833, 835, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1976); Blake v. H-F Group Multiple Listing Serv., 36 Ill. App. 3d 730, 738, 345
N.E.2d 18, 24 (1976); Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Harford County, Inc.,
258 Md. 419, 425, 266 A.2d 1, 4 (1970); Barrows v. Grand Rapids Real Estate Bd., 51
Mich. App. 75, 83, 214 N.W.2d 532, 536 (1974); Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Mul-
tiple Listing Serv., Inc., 113 N.J. Super. 371, 273 A.2d 795, 801 (1971); Grillo v. Board
of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 212, 219 A.2d 635, 645 (1966); Collins v. Main Line Bd.
of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 347, 304 A.2d 493, 496, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
5. Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 384 (1965).
6. E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 41 (1976).
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to be in competition with each other, join in a cooperative associa-
tion which establishes a fixed rate of return for their services.
This is especially so when consumers must frequently utilize
these services in order to make their ultimate purchases. Co-op-
erative associations have been decried as acting in violation of an-
titrust laws; such has been one of the charges leveled against real
estate brokers and their local and national realty boards.
There are countervailing antitrust considerations under which
some trade association 7 activities are permissible without violat-
ing the law. Among them is the view that because antitrust stat-
utes were enacted in part to help protect the independence of
small competitors against potential economic pressures from pro-
ducers, some producers ought to be allowed to join together in an
effort to share some forms of market information. The expansion
of knowledge of market conditions aids all producers to compete
more effectively.
This comment will first present a general overview of the func-
tions of real estate agents and boards of realtors.8 It will then ex-
amine the effects of the recent Supreme Court decision McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. ,9 which held that federal
jurisdiction under the Sherman ActlO may now be utilized to
reach realtors and realty boards. Following an examination of the
permissible roles trade associations can fulfill, this comment will
discuss several of the frequently contested areas of activity in
light of the antitrust law after McLain, including membership and
exclusion policies of boards, the multiple listing service as a re-
straint of trade, and the effect of the multiple listing service as an
information exchange and as a tool for effectuating a group boy-
cott.
7. A trade association is an association of businesspersons selling the same
product or in the same industrial operation, who chose to join together for the pur-
pose of gathering and disseminating information useful to all members. Sugar
Inst. Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598-99 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-84 (1925). Many functions of such associations are
entirely legitimate and promote competition; others have the purpose of stabiliz-
ing prices or effecting a boycott of noncomplying competitors, or other illegal ends.
8. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) has registered with the U.S.
Patent Office the term and mark Realtor@ as a service mark. NATIONAL ASS'N OF
REALTORS, MEMBERSHIP POLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 8 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as NAR MANUAL]. Use of the term or mark is limited to real estate boards
affiliated with NAR.
9. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
10. See note 4 supra.
II. THE REAL ESTATE FRAMEWORK
A focal element of the real estate industry is the real estate
board. Boards operate at the local, state, and national levels, and
generally, one of the primary services they offer to their members
is the multiple listing service (MLS).11 While many multiple list-
ing services operate independently of a local realty board,12 the
vast majority operate as an adjunct of a board. Certainly a con-
nection to a strong parent organization imbues any such service
with operational advantages. Most antitrust real estate cases al-
lege illegal practices of the boards themselves or violations due to
the exclusivity of the MLS or its effect as a restraint on trade.
A. The National Association of Realtors and Member Boards:
Functions and Purposes
The National Association of Realtors (NAR)13 is a trade associa-
tion which charters local real estate boards as "member boards,"
and through its constitution, by-laws, and code of ethics, estab-
lishes certain procedures and policies to which members and
member boards must adhere. Local member boards operate
within geographical areas and, in many states, are affiliated with a
state realty board.
Generally, real estate agents are eligible for membership in the
NAR, as well as local boards. The NAR is among the largest and
most influential trade associations in the country,14 with 750,000
members.15 Its stated goals include "the creation of unity in the
real estate profession, the compilation of relevant information
concerning real estate, the protection of private ownership of real
property, and the establishment of professional standards of prac-
11. See notes 26-41 infra and accompanying text.
12. The following cases involve examples of several independent MLS sys-
tems: Blake v. H-F Group Multiple Listing Serv., 36 Il. App. 3d 730, 345 N.E.2d 18
(1976) (only four member brokers in a locale with 60-70 other brokers and three
other MLSs); Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Harford County, Inc., 258 Md.
419, 266 A.2d 1 (1970) (only about 17% of those eligible to join the MLS had done
so); and Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 113 N.J.
Super. 371, 273 A.2d 795 (1971) (by a stockholder's agreement, membership was re-
stricted to current members and their immediate families).
13. Formerly the National Association of Real Estate Boards.
14. A. RING & J. DASso, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 24 (8th ed.
1977). See also Comment, Exclusion from Real Estate Multiple Listing Services as
Antitrust Violations, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 298, 300 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MLS
Exclusion ].
15. The amazing growth of the field, and particularly of the association, is un-
derscored when it is realized that as of January 1, 1968, membership stood at
84,583. M. UNGER, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 423 (1969). Inciden-
tally, one of every five members is from California. Mankin, The War of the Real-
tors, NEW WEST, Feb. 11, 1980, at 40.
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tice."16 Membership is available to two classes of real estate
agents: brokers and salespeople. Brokers are the "principles,
partners, corporate officers or trustees... engaged principally in
buying, selling, exchanging, renting, or leasing ... (r)eal (e)state
for others for compensation .... ,"17 A broker is required to have
served as a salesperson for at least two years, to have passed a
broker's exam, and, in some states, to have met other educational
requirements. The broker may employ his own sales staff or, as is
often the case, rent space to sales agents and, for a certain per-
centage of the agent's commissions, perform the listing and other
services which salespersons are not entitled to perform.' 8 Sales-
persons cannot operate independently; they must work for or
through a licensed broker. To be a real estate salesperson, one
must comply with state licensing requirements, which generally
include passing a real estate examination and being at least eight-
een years of age.19 Each state establishes its own licensing re-
quirements for both brokers and salespersons.
The NAR has established what is termed an "8-Point Member-
ship Criteria" setting forth the maximum requirements which
may be imposed for membership upon applicant brokers, al-
though local boards may set lesser standards. These require-
ments include that the applicant possess a valid state broker's
license and be "actively engaged" in the real estate business. 20 In
16. NAR MANUAL, supra note 8, at 8.
17. Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 207, 219 A.2d 635, 637 (1966).
18. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10131 (West Supp. 1980) (detailing the
responsibilities of brokers). A salesperson so employed is considered an in-
dependent contractor. NAR MANUAi, supra note 8, at 50.
19. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10132 (West Supp. 1980) (defining real
estate salesmen).
20. NAR MANuA, supra note 8, at 44. "Actively engaged" requires that the li-
censed real estate broker
will have an office for the conduct of real estate business, that such office
will be open for business during normal business hours and that such li-
censee shall hold himself out to the public as being actively engaged in
the real estate business. It does not contemplate that the broker must
devote all or even a majority of his time to his real estate business or de-
rive any particular percentage of his income from such business. It does
not contemplate that the licensee shall have no other job or occupation. It
does contemplate that the licensee shall actively seek real estate busi-
ness.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Additionally, the NAR requires the broker to operate a place of business within
Board jurisdiction and that it comply with local zoning regulations. The applicant
must establish that he or she has established a favorable business reputation in
the community and has a sound credit rating. The applicant must complete the
Brown v. Indianapolis Board of Realtors,21 the United States Dis-
trict Court22 found each of the requirements to be reasonable and
in the public interest.23 The NAR has itself determined that mem-
bership is a valuable right which may be "revoked or modified for
good cause and only under circumstances which afford due pro-
cess." This was so because of the NAR's importance as a trade
association offering specific benefits.24 Among these benefits are
extensive advertising, arbitration services, educational semi-
nars,25 and, of course, the multiple listing system.
B. The Multiple Listing Service
The NAR describes a MLS as "a means of making possible the
orderly dissemination and correlation of listings information to its
members so that Realtors may better serve the buying and selling
public." 26 Basically, a MLS is a means by which all real estate
brokers within a particular geographic area who are members of a
given service pool their information on "exclusive listings"27 and,
in effect, become agents for each other in sales. Any member of
the service may sell any property listed through the service.
Members of the service pay a fee for listings, most of which are
limited to residential properties. Occasionally commercial and in-
vestment properties are included depending upon the focus of the
MLS. When a property is sold by a real estate broker other than
Board indoctrination course, signify intention to abide by the NAR Code of Ethics,
and also the Constitution, By-laws, Policy, and Rules and Regulations of the local
Board, the state association, and the NAR. Id. at 44-45.
21. [1977-11 Trades Cases (CCH) 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
22. Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
23. [1977-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 61,435 at 71,613. In Brown, the plaintiff chal-
lenged the local Board's denial of his membership application. The 8-Point Mem-
bership Criteria, see note 18 supra and accompanying text, are to be the most
rigorous standards a local board can apply to an applicant and no member board
may apply "any arbitrary, numerical or other inequitable limitation on its mem-
bership," NAR Manual, supra note 8, Bylaws, article I, section 2, nor "adopt any
rule, regulation, practice or policy inconsistent with or contrary to any policy
adopted by the Board of Directors," NAR MANuAL, supra note 8, at 73, although a
board is not compelled to adopt all standards. Plaintiff Brown was unable to pro-
vide after two applications, evidence of a favorable business reputation within the
community. The court found the procedures utilized for processing applications to
be fair and lawful, and that any alleged refusals to deal with plaintiff were the re-
sult of individual choice and not a concerted effort by the Board.
24. NAR MANUAL, supra note 8, at 77. See also, MLS Exclusion, supra note 14,
at 301.
25. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of
Trade; 70 CoLum. L. REv. 1325, 1328 (1970).
26. NAR MANuAj, supra note 8, at 7.
27. An exclusive listing is created when a seller enters an agreement with a
real estate agency that only their services will be used to sell the property for a
specified period of time. The property owner agrees not to sell the property on his
own.
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the listing broker, the sales commission is divided between the
listing and selling brokers.28 If the property is sold by the listing
broker, he retains the entire commission, less any service fee paid
to the MLS.
The NAR has set forth certain standards for the operation of
MLSs with which member boards are expected to comply. These
standards provide that cooperation of MLS members with non-
members in the sale of specific property may not be discouraged
or prevented;29 that every board member must be eligible to par-
ticipate in the MLS;30 that participation in the MLS remains op-
28. The division, at least as standard in southern California, is generally on a
50-50 basis. Further, if a salesperson sells the property, he or she will split his por-
tion of the commission with the broker with whom he works, on a negotiated ba-
sis. Thus, on a 6% commission, the listing broker and salesperson share 3% (often
negotiated as between them, 50-50) and the selling broker and selling salesperson
share the other 3%. Commissions of 6% are not required, but that is the usually
"accepted" rate in California. Cases which cite commissions generally range from
5-8% in other areas of the country. The party selling the property pays the com-
mission.
The California legislature has enacted legislation, effective July, 1980, such
that standard form agency agreements must include a notice that any particular
raise of commission is not legally determined; that all commission rates are to be
negotiated between seller and broker. CAL. A.B. 80 as amended.
29. NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF REALTORS, HANDBOOK ON MULTIPLE LISTING POL-
icy 16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MLS HANDBOOK]. By encouraging such cooper-
ation, a board sued for exclusion of a nonmember real estate agent has a
persuasive defense, especially if some instances can be cited of actual joint sales
with the nonmember plaintiff. Such as the case in Brown & Ron Brown Real Es-
tate Inc. v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, [1977-11 Trade Cases 61,435, (S.D. Ind.
1977) at 71,613-14. There the court concluded the alleged refusals to deal could
only be attributed to isolated and unilateral actions by individual board members
and not to the board as a whole. There was, therefore, no violation of antitrust
laws because there were some instances of other members working with Brown in
the sale of a few properties.
It is, of course, useful for a member to assist a nonmember in a sale of one of
the nonmember's properties. However, it appears the real benefit of encouraged
co-operation is one-sided. The nonmember is unable to "co-operate" with sales by
listing the member's property, since a nonmember has no access to the MLS pub-
lication and, thus, cannot "offer" those properties to his clients. The only opportu-
nity a nonmember has in aiding the sale of member property is if members
advertise widely in local newspapers or publish a "Homes"-type publication avail-
able to the public. Such a publication generally lists selected available properties
by local real estate brokers and may be sponsored by the local board, an in-
dependent organization, or even a chamber of commerce or other civic group.
30. MLS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 22. The only requirement imposed is
that the member be willing "to abide by the rules adopted and pay the required
costs .... If one is good enough to be a member of the Board of Realtors, he is
good enough to participate in [the MLS]." Id.
tional;31 that no waiting period be imposed for participation in the
MLS after admission to the board;32 and that the MLS not operate
at a profit.33
Clearly, there are many advantages to participation in a MLS,
whether it is independently operated or sponsored by a member
board. In terms of economic analysis, a MLS operates to reduce
many of the barriers brokers "must face in adjusting supply to de-
mand." The greatest of these barriers is the frequent need of
complete information regarding substantial percentages of avail-
able properties in wide-spread geographic areas, 34 the names of
persons to contact regarding asking prices, finance details, and
the commission which listing brokers are receiving. Without the
MLS, a broker is limited in the selection of homes he may offer
his customers for sale. With a MLS, a broker's selection and sales
force are both greatly expanded. Through a MLS, a broker's list-
ings have much wider exposure. It has been suggested that
[o]ne of the most important functions of a MLS is to provide the small
real-estate office with a diversified inventory of properties which will meet
the needs of all but the most highly discriminating buyers .... [thus pro-
viding] the small office with inventory and promotion potentials equal to
those of the larger firms . . . .35
Another goal of a MLS is for wide and active participation: "A
MLS performs best if it controls such a large proportion of the po-
tential market that all offices except the very large ones become
members." 36 However, once that degree of control is gained, non-
31. Id. It has been suggested that without total cooperation by members, a
multiple listing service will not be as effective. Austin, supra note 25, at 1329.
32. MLS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 22. This is apparently in response to le-
gal challenges to MLSs which had a waiting period of up to a year after joining the
real estate board. See, e.g., Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 205, 219
A.2d 635, 638 (1966).
33. MLS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 22-23. Multiples have been encouraged
to not operate as an obvious profit-making device since the decision of Evanston-
North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d 375, 377 (Ct. Cl. 1963). Any
fees charged should cover only actual operating expenses of the MLS. Because
the board is a trade association, its expenses should be covered primarily by dues,
or else its tax-exempt status could be put in jeopardy. MLS HANDBOOK, supra
note 29, at 25. Further, the NAR recommends that the MLS not become the pri-
mary activity of a board; rather, the NAR recommends that the MLS functions be
carried out either by a committee of the board or as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
the board of realtors.
34. Austin, supra note 25, at 1329.
35. F. CASE, REAL ESTATE MARKET BEHAVIOR IN LOS ANGELES-A STUDY OF
MULTIPLE LISTING SYSTEM DATA 49 (1963). See also, Note, Arbitrary Exclusion
from Multiple Listing: Common-Law and Statutory Remedies, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
570 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Glendale Bd. of Realtors v. Hounsell, 72 Cal. App. 3d 210, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 830 (1977) (Hounsell chose not to become a member of the board); Poma.
nowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 152 N.J. Super. 100, 377 A.2d 791
(1977) (plaintiff terminated his board membership voluntarily prior to seeking ac-
cess to the multiple). The Hounsell court, in granting access to the broker, ac-
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members are unable to compete successfully. Such is the basis of
some of the complaints filed against boards of realtors by real es-
tate agents who have been denied admission to a board, who have
voluntarily chosen to not join, or who have withdrawn from mem-
bership.37
The homeowner who wishes to sell is benefited by a MLS in
that he need only retain the services of one participant of a MLS
in order to receive the services of all other participants of that
MLS. A seller normally has three other options available to him:
he may choose to sell the home on his own, which requires cer-
tain expertise most homeowners lack and a substantial financial
investment to get the equivalent amount of advertising a home re-
ceives in a MLS; he can utilize an open listing;38 or he can give an
exclusive right to sell his property.39
The buyer also enjoys comparable advantages. When his bro-
ker is a member of a MLS, the buyer has a much greater selection
of properties from which to choose. 40 Indeed, the buyer need not
spend much time looking at properties if his broker carefully
matches the MLS listings with the buyer's requirements. Thus
the benefits of participation in a MLS are well distributed among
sellers, buyers, and realtors.
III. THE JURISDICTIoNAL HURDLES SURMOUNTED
Traditionally, there have been three defenses to a finding of fed-
eral jurisdiction under the Sherman Act in real estate brokerage
cases. First, it has been asserted that the sale of property is not a
"trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Second, it has
been asserted that the sale of property is subject to an exemption
from the coverage of the Sherman Act because of the nature of
real estate brokerage as a "profession" or because of the exemp-
tion granted to labor. Finally, it has been asserted that the sale of
cepted the expert testimony of a leading Glendale realtor that if a broker is to
compete effectively against fellow brokers who enjoy such access, he must be able
to use the MLS also. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
37. See 72 Cal. App. 2d 210, 139 Cal. Rptr. 830.
38. An open listing allows the owner to sell the property on his own, even
though he has hired one or more brokers. Of course, when the property sells, that
arrangement could lead to controversy as to which broker is entitled to the com-
mission (and if entitled the amount of the commission). R. KRATovIL & R. WER-
NER, REAL ESTATE LAW § 249 (7th Ed. 1979).
39. See note 26 s-upra.
40. MLS HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 9.
property is of an inherently intrastate character and thus does not
meet the interstate commerce requirement for federal statutory
application. Many antitrust challenges to the use of a MLS, as
well as other practices of real estate brokers have never been ad-
dressed on their merits because, until recently, transactions in
land were never held to be within interstate commerce; hence,
there could be no jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.41
A. The "Trade" of Real Estate Brokerage
United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards42
involved charges of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy against the
Washington Real Estate Board after the board had established
standard commission rates with which members were expected to
comply. The action was brought under section 3 of the Sherman
Act,43 which does not require a finding of interstate commerce.
The activities of the Washington Board were apparently limited to
the Washington, D.C. area, hence, they were within section 3 ju-
risdiction. The position staunchly asserted by the Government in
National Association was that the performance of personal serv-
ices, such as assisting in the buying and selling of homes, was not
a "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The Court
quickly laid that challenge to rest, employing a broad interpreta-
tion of the term. The Court noted that, as long ago as Justice
Story's construction of the term in The Nymph,44 "trade" was
used as the equivalent of an occupation or business. "Wherever
any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the
purpose of profit, or gain, or livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in
the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade."4 5
The Court cited a long line of cases in which various forms of
services had been found to constitute "trade" within the meaning
of the Sherman Act,46 and which specifically rejected any narrow
41. See, e.g., Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke Inc., 587 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1978).
42. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
43. Section 3 of the Sherman Act reads, in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or
of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between
any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territo-
ries and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign
nations, . . . is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such
contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony,....
15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). At the time of the case, however, the Sherman Act under both
§§ 1 and 3 imposed only misdemeanor penalties.
44. 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388).
45. Id. at 507.
46. Included in the history were transportation services, United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897) (Trans-Missouri Freight was
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interpretation of "trade" that would exclude personal services
under section 3.47 Further, the Court held that members of the
Washington Board were entrepreneurs; some operated indepen-
dently while others operated with large staffs, but all were in
business for profit.
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather
than commodities does not take it out of the category of trade within the
meaning of § 3 of the Act. The Act was aimed at combinations organized
and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition 'in the
marketing of goods and services.' 4 8
Thus, the Court refused to carve out a "trade" exception for real
estate brokers: "[tjheir activity is commercial and carried on for
profit."49 The Court left no reason to suspect that a different con-
clusion would be reached under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
B. The Profession Exemption
The leading case attempting to establish an antitrust exemption
for professions was Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.5 0 In Goldfarb,
plaintiffs sought a title examination in order to obtain financing
for a home they had purchased in Virginia. State law permitted
only attorneys to examine title and the local county bar associa-
tion had established a minimum fee schedule applicable to per-
only the second Supreme Court holding under the Sherman Act); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); the cleaning, dying, and renovation of wear-
ing apparel, Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932);
the procurement of medical and hospital services, American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 29 (1943); and the furnishing of news or advertising serv-
ices, Indiana Farmer's Guide Publ. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268
(1934); and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Interestingly, in Trans-Missouri Freight, the Court adopted the position that the
intent of Congress in adopting the Sherman Act was to declare illegal all contracts
in restraint of trade, not, as was argued, only those which created "unreasonable"
restraints. The decision was close -five to four. The dissent, as has frequently
been the case, predicted the future position of the Court, finding that even the
common law of England had found some contracts of restraint to be reasonable.
The shift of the Court was final in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231 (1918), where it was found that all agreements and regulations affecting trade
operate as restraints. The "true test of legality" was held to be whether it is such
as to suppress or destroy competition. Thus, it was found the Sherman Act only
declared contracts or combinations which unreasonably restrained trade to be ille-
gal. 246 U.S. at 238.
47. See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427
(1932).
48. 339 U.S. at 490 (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493
(1940)).
49. Id. at 492.
50. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
forming that service. The Virginia State Bar Association's ethical
opinions instructed members "not to ignore" schedules estab-
lished by county associations. Further, attorneys were instructed
that one could deviate from minimum charges only in deserving
cases, but to do so as standard practice or in order to promote
one's own business was discouraged. The ethical opinions went
so far as to suggest that a pattern of deviation would raise a pre-
sumption of misconduct. Charging more than the minimum fees
recommended was not discouraged.5 ' The Court found such prac-
tices to constitute an illegal fixing of a price floor enforced by the
spectre of disciplinary action by the state bar and motivated by
the assurance that there would be no competition among attor-
neys attempting to underbid each other for services.
The reply offered in Goldfarb was that Congress did not intend
to include the "learned professions" within the terms "trade" or
"commerce" in section 1 of the Sherman Act. In asserting that
Congress intended to exclude professions from section 1, the Vir-
ginia State Bar contended that competition was inconsistent with
the practice of a profession because the goal of professions was to
provide necessary services to the community and not to enhance
profits.5 2 The Court found no legislative history to support that
position nor any support in case law. Rather, it found an intent to
"strike broadly" at anticompetitive practices and that to recognize
a business aspect in the practice of law would not disparage the
profession. The Court noted that the sale of services had not
been found to be beyond the scope of section 1.53 The Court cited
Associated Press v. United States5 4 which held that the nature of
an occupation, alone, did not provide sanctuary from the Sherman
Act,55 and made reference to United States v. National Associa-
tion of Real Estate Boards5 6 while commenting that a "public-
service aspect" of a profession is not determinative of whether a
profession is included within section 1.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,57
the status of a professional association was again argued to con-
51. Id. at 777 n.4 and 778.
52. Id. at 786. In fact the Court found that the Bar's evidence itself belied that
position. They noted that the first line of the State Bar's 1962 Minimum Fee
Schedule Report stated: "nThe lawyers have slowly, but surely, been committing
economic suicide as a profession.'" Id. n.16. This suggested to them a less than
"wholly altruistic" motive in adopting the schedule.
53. Id. at 787. The Court cited American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317
U.S. 519 (1943) and Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) for
the proposition.
54. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
55. Id. at 7.
56. 421 U.S. at 787.
57. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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stitute an exemption to the Sherman Act. The Court did not ac-
cept the argument, and society's practices were disallowed. The
focus, however, was not on the professional exemption, but upon
the district and appellate courts' misapplication of the rule of rea-
son to the society's contention that the practice it adopted elimi-
nated potential endangerment of public safety.5 8
The society placed great weight on a footnote in the Goldfarb
opinion,5 9 where the Court distinguished between restraints in
businesses and those within professions in determining illegality
under the Sherman Act. The Court in National Society read this
footnote, not as supporting a professional exemption, but as advo-
cating application of the rule of reason standard to professional
activities when such are alleged to be antitrust violations.
The trend clearly has been to apply the antitrust laws to the ef-
forts of professional organizations to establish noncompetitive fee
schedules. 60 A number of consent decrees have been filed, both
in real estate brokerage cases as well as cases involving other pro-
fessions, limiting such activities.6 '
58. The practice involved in Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers was a pro-
cedure designed to eliminate competitive bidding and requiring members to not
discuss the price aspects of a job with a client until after the engineer had been
selected for the job. The Court applied the rule of reason standard to the practice
and found that while enforcement of competitive bidding might work to the detri-
ment of public safety by encouraging engineers to use inferior quality and lower-
priced materials, that was not a necessary result of competitive bidding. Under
the rule of reason such potential effects are factors to be considered, but in this
case it did not justify condoning the anticompetitive practice. Id.
59. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17. Footnote 17 reads:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that partic-
ular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view
the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activi-
ties, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts
which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other fea-
tures of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation
than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id.
60. See generally, Dunfee, Sherman Act Applicability to Real Estate Boards,
10 Am. Bus. L.J. 139 (1972).
61. For example, consent decrees have been obtained in the case of fee sched-
ules against architects, United States v. Am. Inst. of Architects, [1972] Trade Cases
[ 73,981 (D.D.C. entered on June 19, 1972); civil engineers, United States v. Am.
Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, [19721 Trade Cases 73,950 (S.D.N.Y. entered June 1, 1972);
and certified public accountants, United States v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants Inc., [1972] Trade Cases 74,007 (D.D.C. entered on July 6, 1972). Exam-
ples of those decrees filed against real estate boards include United States v.
C. The Labor Exemption
The largest exemption to antitrust coverage applies to the labor
market and collective bargaining agreements. If traditional anti-
trust analysis were applied to labor oganizations, such organiza-
tions would necessarily be found to be "combinations" or
"conspiracies" in restraint of trade, since much of their intent is
to enter into labor agreements which necessarily limit manage-
ment's ability to act in certain areas. Section 6 of the Clayton
Act 62 recognizes the special nature of human labor as a noncom-
modity and states that labor organizations are not to be regarded
as illegal combinations in restraint of trade. This position is forti-
fied by the National Labor Relations Act.63 However, the exemp-
tion is limited to organized labor and its efforts to have a voice in
the determination of terms and conditions of employment. Thus,
labor unions may engage in practices which would otherwise be
prohibited, as long as the union is acting in its members' best
Cleveland Real Estate Bd., [1972] Trade Cases 74,020 (N.D. Ohio entered July 17,
1972), requiring inclusion in all rules, constitution, code of ethics, regulations, con-
tracts, and other forms, a provision that the commission rates are negotiable be-
tween broker and client; United States v. Atlanta Real Estate Bd., [1972] Trade
Cases $ 73,787 (N.D. Ga. entered Feb. 4, 1972) prohibited board from recom-
mending or fixing rates for members and from taking any punitive action against
members not following suggested rates; and United States v. Prince George's
County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., [1971] Trade Cases 73,393 (D.Md. entered Dec. 28,
1980), prohibiting board from fixing or publishing commission rates or schedules,
taking any punitive action against fee cutting members, fixing a division of com-
mission between listing and selling brokers, and required MLS and Board fees to
be reasonable related to costs, and forms include provision that commissions are
to be negotiated between broker and seller.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). Section 6 states:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organiza-
tions, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade,
under the antitrust laws.
Id.
63. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act declares in part:
It is ... to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to miti-
gate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or-
ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151.
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self-interest and while the union is not combining with nonlabor
groups to accomplish its objectives.
In United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards,6 4 representatives of the real estate industry argued that
the sale of their services fell within the antitrust exemption
carved out for labor. The Court refused to extend the definition of
labor to include the services performed by brokers. It limited the
reading of section 6 of the Clayton Act only to matters involving
the employee-employer relationship.65 The basic distinction is
clear: the real estate agent performs individual services which di-
rectly affect commerce through the sale of property, whereas la-
bor unions deal with the conditions under which employees will
perform their services.
The California Supreme Court has announced a parallel distinc-
tion under the state's Cartwright Act.66 In Messner v. Journeymen
Barbers, Hairdressers and Cosmetologists, International Union,67
it was stated that "[ajlthough human labor is not a 'commodity',
under the act (§ 16703), a service consisting in the main of human
labor is."68 A test for determining whether an act is a service or
labor was laid down in Matin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v.
Palsson.69 "The relevant question, in every case, is whether the
practice in question is meant to further the interest of tradesmen
as employees in a collective bargaining context, or whether it is
designed to advance their interests as entrepreneurs."70
D. Land Transactions Constitute Interests Commerce Under the
Antitrust Acts
The effect of "little Sherman Acts," in the states which have en-
acted them as well as the common-law action for restraint of
trade has been minimal. There has reportedly been a disinclina-
tion to enforce state antitrust laws in land transactions by state
authorities due to both the strong political pressure exerted by
real estate boards and a fear of "scaring away" revenue-producing
64. 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
65. 339 U.S. at 490.
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-58 (West 1964 & Supp. 1980).
67. 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351 P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960).
68. Id. at 886, 351 P.2d at 355, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
69. 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976).
70. Id. at 927, 549 P.2d at 837, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
local industries through active enforcement.71 If, in fact, activities
of real estate boards were operating to restrain competition, the
most effective control would have to be through the federal anti-
trust law. The Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving
Co. 72 held that the jurisdictional reach of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act was keyed directly to effects on interstate markets and
the interstate flow of goods,73 thus the federal alternative was not
available until real estate transactions could be found to be
within interstate commerce. 74
Although the setting of real estate sales commissions in the
District of Columbia was found to be an antitrust violation in
United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,75
that case was brought under section 3 of the Sherman Act, not
section 1.76 On January 8, 1980, the United States Supreme Court
in the case of McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. ,77
redefined the scope of section 1 to include land transactions.
McLain was a private antitrust action brought under section 1
of the Sherman Act charging member brokers of the real estate
boards in the greater New Orleans area of engaging in a price-
fixing conspiracy. The complaint alleged a combination and con-
spiracy to fix, control, raise, and stabilize prices in the sale and
purchase of homes in the area through the use of fixed commis-
sion rates, widespread fee splitting between listing and selling
brokers, suppression of market information which would be of
value to buyers and sellers,78 and other anticompetitive prac-
tices.79 Petitioners argued that through fixing and maintaining
commissions at artificially high and noncompetitive levels, the
price of residential properties had been artificially raised. Pri-
mary reliance was placed upon the allegation that brokers aided
clients in obtaining financing and title insurance, much of which
was supplied by out-of-state sources to support a finding that ac-
71. Austin, supra note 25, at 1336.
72. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
73. Id. at 194.
74. "In determining whether there has been a violation of the Sherman Act
the test is whether the acts complained of substantially and adversely affect inter-
state commerce." Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 578
F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218
(1947)).
75. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
76. Section 3 does not deal with antitrust violations in interstate commerce,
but deals with such violations within any United States territory or within the Dis-
trict of Columbia and deals with such violations in commerce between territories
and the District of Columbia.
77. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
78. Although the opinion does not so specify, this information is presumably
contained in the respective multiple listing system materials.
79. 444 U.S. at 235.
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tivities were within interstate commerce. Petitioners also as-
serted that a finding of interstate commerce could be supported
by persons moving into and out of the greater New Orleans area
who utilized the respondent's broker services.80
The district court in McLain8l had not been persuaded that an
adequate nexus to intersate commerce had been established for
federal jurisdiction and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
"[B]rokerage activities are wholly intrastate in nature and, since
they neither occur in nor substantially affect interstate commerce,
are beyond the ambit of federal anti-trust prohibition."82 The
court's analysis relied primarily on whether the McLain facts
could be brought within the holding of Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.83 The district court read Goldfarb as requiring a substantial
volume of interstate commerce be involved in the overall real es-
tate transaction and the challenged activity itself be an "essential,
integral part of the transaction and inseparable from its interstate
aspects." 84 The court declined to find federal jurisdiction under
this view of Goldfarb and held the participation of the brokers in
the interstate aspects of the transactions (financing, insurance,
and movement of people) to be merely incidental rather than in-
dispensible elements of a sale of property within the state.85 The
dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit,86 which essentially adopted the district court's interpretation
of Goldfarb.87
The Supreme Court in McLain defined two steps for a finding
of federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act which had long
been recognized in more traditional antitrust cases. These are
now extended to real estate brokerage transactions, and, presum-
80. Id.
81. 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La. 1977).
82. Id. at 983.
83. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). For a discussion of Goldfarb, see notes 50-56 supra and
accompanying test.
84. 432 F. Supp. at 984.
85. Id. at 985.
86. 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. First, the appellate court found that realty was a "quintessentially local
product" and the complained of brokerage activities occurred wholly intrastate;
thus, the "in commerce" test was not met. Id. at 1319. Second, they found that the
"effect on commerce" test was not met because "unlike the attorneys in Goldfarb
whose participation in title insurance was statutorily mandated, real estate bro-
kers are neither necessary nor integral participants in the 'interstate aspects' of
realty financing and insurance." Id. at 1322.
ably, to other cases where a finding of interstate commerce is un-
certain.
It is well established that Congress has broad authority under
the Commerce Clause 88 to control not only things actually in in-
terstate commerce, but also to control local activities which sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. 8 9 While these two
requirements have generally been treated as separate, it has been
suggested that they are parts of an economic continuum.90 In
terms of antitrust violations, the Supreme Court has held that the
exact point at which local activities affect interstate commerce is
largely irrelevant, "if the forbidden effects [flow] across it to the
injury of interstate commerce or to the hindrance or defeat of
congressional policy regarding it."91 Once the economic contin-
uum has been identified and traded, the inquiry focuses on
whether or not the effect of local activity is "sufficiently substan-
tial and adverse" to congressional policy to be declared illegal. 92
In McLain, the Court recognized that Congress had determined
to preserve the two separate tests for interstate commerce in anti-
trust cases. This intention was evidenced by the restricted lan-
guage in the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts which is limited
only to activities "in commerce," 93 and the application of the
stricter "in the flow of commerce" test to actions brought under
the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts.94
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
89. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (operating a restau-
rant); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (operating a
motel); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (growing wheat on only 11.9 acres);
and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (wage and hour regulation). The
"substantial effect" test was set forth in Wickard as including local, intrastate ac-
tivities which exert "a substantial economic effect on intrastate commerce." 317
U.S. at 125.
90. For a general critique of the economic continuum theory, see Austin, supra
note 25, at 1333-34. See also Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Lit-
igation, 25 FED. B.J. 282, 286-87 (1965).
91. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
232 (1948).
92. Id. at 234. The "extended" view marks a departure from earlier construc-
tions of commerce. See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 587-92 (1898);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1895).
93. The Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (current ver-
sion at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976), amended the Clayton Act ch. 328, 38 Stat. 730
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44, (1976)). Throughout the Clayton Act, the
specific actvities indentifled and prohibited are limited to those "engaged in com-
merce." Sections 2 and 3, for example, identify any persons engaged in commerce,
and section 7 holds that "no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire...
[or otherwise merge with another corporation engaged also in commerce]." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
94. In finding Congress intended to broadly exercise its regulatory power
under section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) stated:
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Determining that the "affecting commerce" test was appropriate
in McLain,95 the Court next required that the specific nexus be-
tween the local activity and interstate commerce be identified.96
This did not require that the activity alleged to be unlawful must
itself be shown to have had an effect on commerce, but rather
that a less particularized showing of real estate brokerage activi-
ties had a demonstrable and substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.97 The support for this view was found in the fact that
Sherman Act liability arises with proof of either an unlawful pur-
pose or an anticompetitive effect.98 The Supreme Court essen-
tially found that the lower courts has misapplied Goldfarb to the
instant case. The activities in Goldfarb were found impermissible
In contrast to § 1 [of the Sherman Anti Trust Act], the distinct in com-
merce language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act provisions with
which we are concerned here appears to denote only persons or activities
within the flow of interstate commerce-the practical, economic continuity
in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their
transport and distribution to the consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional
requirements of these provisions cannot be satisfied merely by showing
that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce.
Id. at 195 (emphasis in original). This position was fortified in United States v.
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), where the Court ex-
pressly denied extension to a broader "affecting commerce" test in a merger case
brought under section 7 of the Clayton Act. They stated that the express language
used meant the Act "was not intended to reach all corportaions engaged in activi-
ties subject to the federal commerce power." 422 U.S. at 283.
The original language of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in-
cluded provisions to extend the commerce test of the Clayton and Robinson-Pat-
man Acts, and thus overrule Copp Paving and American Building Maintenance.
Those provisions were not enacted.
Notably, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979)), originally pro-
vided only for activities "in commerce." The Supreme Court applied the stricter
test of "in commerce" as called for in FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) in a
case involving local frauds. That case was overruled by Congress in the
Magnuson-Moss-Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act Pub. L
93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46, & 52 (1976 &
Supp. 11I 1979)) by striking out "in commerce" wherever used and substituting "in
or affecting commerce."
95. Holdings for the appropriateness of either test for the Sherman Act are
found in: Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949); and Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-37 (1948).
96. 444 U.S. 232, 242-44 (1980).
97. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (1940).
98. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13
(1978); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
under the "in commerce" test; thus there was no need to analyze
the facts under an "affecting commerce" approach. The activities
in McLain were somewhat more attenuated in their relationship
to interstate commerce.
Thus, the first step set forth in McLain was to find activities
"in" or "affecting" interstate commerce. This the Court found in
both the financing and title insurance aspects of the transactions
in question.99 The second step required in order to establish ju-
risdiction under the Sherman Act was to find that the specific ac-
tivities have a "not insubstantial effect" on the interstate
commerce involved in real estate brokerage100 The distinction is
subtle. The Court traced the process as such:
[T] he function of. . . real estate brokers is to bring the buyer and seller
together on agreeable terms. For this service the broker charges a fee
generally calculated as a percentage of the sale price. Brokerage activities
necessarily affect both the frequency and the terms of residential sales
transactions. Ultimately, whatever stimulates or retards the volume of
residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the de-
mand for financing and title insurance, those two commercial activities
that on this record are shown to have occurred in interstate commerce.
Where, as here, the services of respondent real estate brokers are often
employed in transactions in the relevant market, petitioners at trial may
be able to show that respondents' activities have a not insubstantial effect
on interstate commerce. 1 0 1
This case decided only that jurisdiction existed under the Sher-
man Act and that the district court was in error in granting re-
spondents' motion to dismiss. Consequently, the court never
reached the merits of the allegations of fixed commissions, fee
splitting, and suppression of market information. The language of
the above-quoted portion of the opinion does suggest that the
Court might find the activities do operate to impact upon the
purchase price of properties and fix commissions in a noncompet-
itive manner. If price fixing were to be found, the activity would
99. The facts indicated the following: first, financing monies were raised from
out-of-state investors by the local lending institutions; second, interbank loans
were obtained from interstate financial institutions; third, multistate lending insti-
tutions took mortgages insured by federal agencies such as the Veteran's Admin-
istration, which necessitated the transfer of premiums and settlements between
states; fourth, mortgage obligations became financial instruments in the interstate
secondary mortgage market; and fifth, all of the title insurance companies in the
New Orleans area were branches or subsidiaries of other companies based outside
of Louisiana. 444 U.S. at 245.
100. Id. at 246. See also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738, 745 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 784 n.11 (1975); Burke v.
Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967).
101. 444 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added). The McLain analysis has most recently
been followed in Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control & Waste
Mgt., Inc., [1980-81] Trade Cases 63,213.
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be per se violative of the Sherman Act.102 However, the lower
courts, in determining whether an activity constitutes price fixing,
look to the reasonableness of the practice and its effects on com-
petition.103
The Court in McLain also raised the possibility that federal ju-
risdiction could be based in real estate brokerage cases on the
amount of interstate commerce involved in the interstate move-
ment of people. 0 4 The extent to which out-of-state persons em-
ploy the services of local brokers in securing new homes
necessarily involves interstate commerce. A newcomer's primary
credit information and financing will be localized elsewhere and
the transfer of the downpayment money will generally occur prior
to the move of the buyer into another state.
IV. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INFORMATION EXCHANGES
It has long been recognized that "nearly every trade organiza-
tion imposes some restraint upon the conduct of business by its
members."'1 05 In terms of determining the legality of exercised re-
straints, the focus is on the competitive or anticompetitive effects
of individual practices.
There is a natural tendency for members of the same profession
or industry to meet together to learn more about developments in
the field so that each has a better basis upon which to make busi-
ness judgments and to more readily respond to changing market
and economic conditions. On a theoretical level, the more knowl-
edgeable each competitor is, the more vigorous and effective will
be competition in the product market as a whole. Each member
will be able to most effectively utilize his resources to maximize
his production and services and to reach optimum profits and out-
put. Thus, one affect of trade associations is to encourage compe-
tition.
The concern of the Sherman Act is to maintain free and open
competition. In order to achieve that end, Congress has declared
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade to be
illegal. The obligation of the courts has thus been to determine
102. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
103. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (1958).
104. 444 U.S. at 246.
105. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918).
which associational activities are clearly illegal and which can be
justified by promoting competition. Since 1911, in the Standard
Oil case, 106 the approach has been to analyze the activities under
a "rule of reason" standard. The Supreme Court in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, expanded upon this position,
and in terms of associational restraints, determined that the con-
cern of the antitrust laws was only to prevent unreasonable re-
straints. 07 Factors were set forth by which to measure the
reasonableness of restraints under scrutiny:
[TI he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are
all relevant facts.1 0 8
In applying these criteria to trade associations, the inevitable
problem is the wide range of purposes for which members have
come together and the multitude of programs and activities which
they may conduct. The question is what point do some go beyond
the bounds of legality, and to what extent are their illegal activi-
ties counterbalanced by other activities which promote competi-
tion.
Trade associations clearly fall within the scope of section 1 of
the Sherman Act: they are combinations of competitors. They
are often bound together by a constitution or by-laws, and to that
extent they operate under contract. Further, practices need not
be express in order to violate the Sherman Act; concerted activity
may be inferred from parallel conduct, if certain other factors are
present. 0 9
106. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
107. 246 U.S. at 238.
108. Id.
109. The Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208
(1939), found an illegal agreement inferred from the parallel practices of distribu-
tors of first-run movies. The test used by the Court was that an unlawful activity
would be found where concerted action was contemplated and invited, and where
competitors had participated in a concerted action. In Interstate Circuit, a letter,
suggesting a particular practice for movie distribution, had been sent by a movie
exhibitor. There was strong motivation for each distributor to adopt the suggested
practice in the area. The suggested practice was a significant departure from pre-
vious practice; however, there was no express agreement nor any overt communi-
cations beyond the initial letter. These factors, when taken in conjunction with
the uniform action of the competing distributors involved allowed the inference of
an illegal scheme. The Court found the fact that the defendants had not at-
tempted to explain or justify their activity to be significant.
Later cases have upheld the inference of concerted activity. See, e.g., American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (no express agreement). In Thea-
tre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), the
Court refused to allow an injunction against film distributors who refused to show
first-run movies at suburban theaters. The Court found that the refusals were not
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In terms of the power of a trade association to maintain internal
control over members and its consequent ability to affect external
influence, three factors have been identified as determinative:
"the brute totals of membership rolls, the economic resources of
members, and the character of the field sought to be influenced
by the association."' 10 Austin has concluded that all three factors
exist within the framework of the NAR and its local member
boards."' The total membership of the NAR and its member
boards is large, a fact underscored by judicial recognition of the
fact that for a nonmember broker to compete effectively, he must
have access to the primary service offered by the local boards-
the MLS.112 The most significant factor is the nature of the field
over which the realtor associations exert influence. As earlier dis-
cussed,113 private owners of property lack a great deal of the
training, resources, and expertise necessary to enable them to ef-
fectively sell their own property. The service of a broker is very
often required to bring together a buyer and a seller and to steer
the respective parties in the direction of appropriate financing, ti-
tle insurance, and other elements necessary to close a real estate
transaction legally.
A. The Concentration of Power
As the case law has developed regarding the permissibility of
trade association activities, the first step in the analysis is to de-
termine the concentration of power in the relevant market pos-
sessed by members. The geographic markets are easily defined
by the parameters allotted to the respective local boards. For ex-
ample, in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,114 it
was determined that 5% of the hardwood plants (members of the
defendant association) produced one-third of the nation's hard-
wood supply. In another case, United States v. Container Corp. of
a departure from past practice and that each refusal was an independent decision
based upon economic factors, not based upon an agreement among the distribu-
tors. The Court classifled the situation as interdependent action-each competitor
takes (or does not take) an action because to do otherwise would be economically
unsound. This is particularly true where very standardized or uniform products
are involved, such as milk.
110. Austin, supra note 25, at 1326.
111. Id. at 1326-27.
112. See note 37 supra.
113. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
114. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
America,115 eighteen firms were determined to be the suppliers of
90% of the requirements of cardboard cartons in the southeast.
Today, participation of real estate brokers in local real estate
boards is admittedly high.116 If, for example, 75% of licensed bro-
kers and salespersons in a given territory are members of the lo-
cal real estate board, the power criterion is undoubtedly met. No
arbitrary percentage ratio of members to nonmembers has been
established beyond which an undue concentration of power is
found; concentration of power is determined by also examining
the percentage of the market controlled by the larger competing
members with a trade association. The concern is for the impact
upon the market resulting from actions taken by top competitors.
This aspect of analysis in brokerage cases would be difficult to
pursue without extensive examination of all member brokers and
their volume of business. It is not an absolute barrier, however.
Given the high percentage ratio of members to nonmembers in
the real estate brokerage profession, the courts could reasonably
require a lesser degree of proof of market competition. This
would be so although a particular practice is viewed to be an-
ticompetitive because the percentage of the market controlled by
each member would likely be small. The framework of the real
estate brokerage profession is somewhat unique in character as
compared with the traditional trade associations examined by
courts in prior antitrust cases, primarily due to the wide demand
for the specialized service.
B. The Restraints Involved
The second stage of the analysis regarding the permissibility of
trade associations requires an examination of the particular re-
straint(s) involved. In the case of real estate boards, these gener-
ally take the form of an information exchange among the
membership. It is here that the purpose and effect of the re-
straint is examined. The courts have found certain practices to be
per se violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act, particularly price
fixing schemes, group boycotts, and territorial market alloca-
tions.1' 7 However, rather than apply the per se standard when
115. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
116. Contrast some earlier cases where no harm was found in denying member
access because the participation in the board in the area was so low generally.
See, e.g., Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, [1977-11 Trade Cases 61,435 (S.D.
Ind. 1977), where the court found that of the 6,000 licensed brokers in Marion
County, Indiana, only 1,000 were members of the Board. Of those, only 160 were
members of the multiple listing service.
117. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (price fixing);
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (price fixing);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); Chicago
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such are created through a trade association, the courts apply the
rule of reason, a departure rationalized perhaps only because of
the recognition of the procompetitive effects such associations
can have. After analyzing the nature of the restraint, it is ex-
amined in light of its effects on competition within that market.
This is the stage of analysis at which "reasonableness" comes into
play. Section V of this comment will examine specific charges
against real estate brokerage activities in this framework, but the
principles underlying the nature of information exchanges will be
set forth here as developed by case law.
In American Column & Lumber v. United States,11 8 the trade
association involved developed an "Open Competition Plan" by
which members would fie various daily, weekly, and monthly re-
ports including detailed information on price lists, daily sales and
shipments reports, stock-on-hand information, orders taken in
and the prices quoted, and future price estimations. The informa-
tion was then compiled and distributed to members with the date
identifying the particular members. Prices were found to change
almost uniformly and sanctions were imposed against members
not complying with the filing requirements. The Court found that
"[sluch close cooperation, between many persons, firms and cor-
porations controlling a large volume of interstate commerce,...
is . . . inconsistent with that free and unrestricted trade which
the statute contemplates shall be maintained .... 119
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (price fixing); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 as amended 312 U.S. 668 (1941)
(group boycott); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30
(1930) (group boycott); United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
(market allocation); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (market allocation); National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States,
263 U.S. 403 (1923). Here, market allocation was upheld because the plan was de-
vised to secure full and equitable employment of a short supply of skilled hand-
blown window glass craftsmen among the many factories; thus, the plan was not
unreasonable restraint in the circumstances. The procompetitive effect was to al-
low each factory to maintain some production.
The Supreme Court upheld a price-fixing agreement in Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); however, this case is usually distinguished as
an "anomoly," having arisen during the special circumstances of the depression.
118. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
119. Id. at 409. However, several strong dissenting opinions were fied support-
ing the role of a trade association:
The Sherman Law does not prohibit every lessening of competition; and it
certainly does not command that competition shall be pursued blindly,
that business rivals shall remain ignorant of trade facts or be denied aid in
Regarding the issue of the extent to which competitors can re-
veal to each other the details of their operations, it has been held
that
[i]n the absence of a purpose to monopolize or the compulsion that re-
sults from contract or agreement, the individual certainly may exercise
great freedom; but concerted action through combination presents a whol-
ly different problem and is forbidden when the necessary tendancy is to
destroy the kind of competition to which the public has long looked for
protection.
1 20
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., presented a "competi-
tion plan" very similar to that in American Column. The Court in
both cases gave great weight to the coercive element toward con-
formity created by the device used, primarily the identification of
the members and their individual actions. An oligopolistic price
system results from sharing of such detailed business informa-
tion, and should any member deviate, sanctions can be readily
imposed. However, such a business reporting system was found
not to violate the Sherman Act in Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Association v. United States.121 In that case, the information ex-
change system was found to be "purely" informational. It did not
identify sellers; it did not contain current price lists; there were
no efforts to forecast prices and supplies; and no sanctions were
imposed for failure to report or for deviation from norms. Analo-
gizing these systems to the MLS suggests that close scrutiny is
warranted; listing brokers are identified and the percent of com-
mission to be earned is listed.122
Another factor in determining whether or not an informational
exchange violates the Sherman Act is the degree to which the
compiled information is made available to the public or distrib-
uted only to member-competitors. In Maple Flooring, the Court
noted that reports were supplied to the Department of Commerce
and the the Federal Reserve Board. In contrast, distribution of
MLS materials are expressly confined to MLS members, and in
weighing their significance. It is lawful to regulate competition in some
degree.
Id. at 415 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918)).
120. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923) (empha-
sis added).
121. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
122. Interestingly, in the Conejo Valley, California MLS books, a new practice
has recently emerged, presumably paralleled in many other areas. Frequently,
only the commission to be received by the selling broker is listed, along with the
selling price and other information. The prior practice was to list the commission
at the relevant percentages, for example, 6%. Now, the listings only include per-
centages of, for example, 3% or 2.5%. It is doubtful that this change would make
MLS listing practices any more or less permissible.
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many areas, sanctions are imposed for a member making a listing
available to a nonmember or member of the public.
Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States123 involved a trade associa-
tion composed of members who together produced 70-80% of the
nation's sugar. Adherance to prices and terms of sale were en-
forced by means of a reporting system. This was found to be an
unreasonable restraint on the freedom of individual producers to
operate. The Court, however, did find that the system would be
permissible if the requirement of adherence to announced prices
was eliminated, if restraints supporting that requirement were re-
moved, and if all statistical information was made available to
purchasers and distributors, as well as to producer-members. In
contrast, in Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v.
United States,124 an information exchange system was upheld as
reasonable where it was designed to achieve legitimate business
purposes. One goal of this system was to prevent cement buyers
from placing fraudulent orders. The data compiled made no com-
ment on the information, nor were prices even discussed.
It appears that the factors which the courts primarily focus
upon in assessing the legality of an information exchange system
among trade association members include the following: price
data, detail of orders and supplies, identification of the members
supplying the information, use of the price information to project
(or require) future prices with the resulting tendency to stabilize
prices among the member-competitors, and the extent of distribu-
tion of the compiled data. These are issues to which local real es-
tate boards should pay close attention in determining their MLS
policies, now that the barriers to federal jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act have been removed in real estate bro-
kerage cases. However, the presence or absence of these factors
is not determinative. The systems must be evaluated for their ef-
fects on competition to determine if they survive scrutiny under
the standard of reasonableness.
V. ALLEGED ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN THE REAL ESTATE
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY
The background, against which antitrust allegations in the real
estate brokerage industry must be assessed, was succinctly sum-
123. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
124. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
marized by one federal appellate judge who stated that "the cases
that have considered the relationship of particular real estate bro-
kerage activities to commerce are in hopeless disarray so far as
their raw results are concerned." 125
This section will examine some of the charges of antitrust viola-
tions which have been leveled against real estate boards them-
selves as well as against the operations of multiple listing services
under the framework of federal antitrust policy. Some of the ar-
eas of contention have already been resolved, at least in a few ju-
risdictions, while in others, cases are still pending. It is important
to recall at this juncture, that even though some of these cases
were brought under state legislation, many of those states have
already held the interpretation of the federal antitrust acts as ap-
plicable. 126 The impact of McLain, in light of this fact, raises the
possibility of expanded antitrust jurisdiction in every state. This,
coupled with the precedent established in National Association of
Real Estate Boards, should motivate local boards to carefully re-
evaluate their policies and practices.
A. Membership in Boards: A Prerequisite to Success?
One of the primary concerns which arises in an examination of
trade associations is the power such an organization can wield to
the advantage of members and the corresponding unlawful disad-
vantages to nonmembers that may result from the exercise of
such power.127 With respect to real estate boards, it is unques-
125. United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1328 (4th Cir. 1979). For an example
of the opposing positions taken by courts on the single issue of whether an ade-
quate nexus to interstate commerce has been established, see the appellate opin-
ion of McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315, 1319-20 (5th
Cir. 1978).
126. See note 4 supra.
127. See Austin, supra note 25, at 1340. Austin draws a distinction between two
types of associations. The first includes those associations that adopt exclusionary
conduct, the objective of which is the destruction of nonmembers as viable com-
petitors. Such a direct objective would be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (buying power used
directly to force suppliers to refuse to deal with competitors). In contrast Austin
views the real estate boards as self-restricting organizations with their primary
goal to bind members to uniform regulations that result in the greatest benefit to
the whole. No attempt is made to directly harm outside groups and any harm that,
in fact, occurs is only tangentially related to the associations' practices. "Since the
primary objective is not the destruction of particular brokers or nonmember bro-
kers as a class, the Klor's principle, that a group boycott designed to coerce is per
se unlawful, should not apply. Austin, supra note 25, at 1341. Therefore, since a
per se violation is not apparent, the existence of a violation of the Sherman Act by
real estate boards must be determined by employing a standard of reasonable-
ness. See note 154 infra.
Austin further notes that whatever the intended objective of an association may
be, its overall objective is to attain certain economic benefits. He believes that the
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tionable that members receive material benefits and competitive
advantages that range from national and regional advertising to
the use of the copyrighted term "Realtor."128 In addition to the
availability of a number of valuable services,129 members of real
estate boards are afforded the advantages of public confidence
and business opportunities conferred by the prestige of member-
ship.130
As a result of the existence of membership advantages, how-
ever, nonmembers are necessarily subjected to corresponding dis-
advantages in competition.' 3 ' The competitive disadvantages of
exclusion from board membership are fairly obvious, 132 particu-
larly with respect to MLS access. Nonmembers are denied the
advantages of co-operative selling,133 valuable services, 3 4 and the
distinguishing characteristic of trade associations in modern society is the attain-
ment of economic and political power. Austin concludes by stating that an "impor-
tant by-product of this phenomenon is that admission to, or exclusion from
membership is frequently of crucial significance to those included, to those ex-
cluded, and to the public." Austin, supra note 25, at 1341 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1328. The term "Realtor®" is the copyrighted property of the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards which has been described as one of the
most powerful and influential business organizations in the country. See P. BEN-
SON, M. NORTH & A. RING, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 18 (4th ed.
1954).
129. The advantages and benefits of memberships include the prestige of mem-
bership wich carries with it public confidence and business opportunities, the
availability of MLS, business information, and appraisal services, the limiting of
market imperfection due to the reduction of information and communication barri-
ers, and the extensive co-operation among a greater salesforce. See Austin, supra
note 25, at 1328-29.
130. See note 128 supra. This may be seen in the fact that only National Asso-
ciation members are allowed to capitalize on the use of the protected title, "Real-
tor®."
131. See note 127 supra. As noted, this disadvantage may be the result of an
intentioned external objective or merely tangentially related to an association's at-
tempt to reap greater benefits for itself.
132. See Comment, supra note 14, at 314. The author notes several adverse ef-
fects that result in a denial of board memberships and the corresponding lack of
MLS information. Without a high quantity of available properties within a given
area, the broker cannot adequately serve a prospective buyer. Customers will
likely seek out MLS members who can more fully meet their needs. By the same
rationale, sellers will seek out MLS members to list their property in order to in-
sure the greatest exposure. In addition, qualified salespeople will more likely seek
positions with MLS members since they will then be assured of the greatest vol-
ume of potential business and, hence, a larger volume of commissions.
133. See Austin, supra note 25, at 1329 n.33 (citing F. CASE, REAL ESTATE 376-77
(1962)):
Cooperative selling is the best means yet developed for providing a cen-
tral market place in which: (1) prices may be established on a more uni-
form basis; (2) property for sale may be previewed by sellers and buyers
reduction of information, communication, and geographical barri-
ers135 that attach to board membership. Also, nonmembers must
face greater obstacles in adjusting supply to demand since less
property is available for them to sell. Since members capture a
larger share of the market, nonmembers suffer substantial eco-
nomic and competitive disadvantages.
1. Membership Policies and Standards as Group Boycotts
Voluntary associations cannot be required to accept as mem-
bers all who apply or desire to join.136 However, when an associa-
tion's activities "correspond directly with and touch upon the
business activities of its members and ... the association has the
power to shape and influence the economic environment of its
particular market,"'137 its practices and activities are subject to
scrutiny under the antitrust laws. 138
With respect to the practices of real estate boards, and specifi-
cally to their membership policies and standards, the issue be-
comes whether or not exclusion from membership may be
characterized as a group boycott 39 thereby operating as an un-
easily; and (3) the process of buying and selling may be systematized.
Co-operative selling offers great promise of providing the type of central
market activity which will stabilize market trends and permit buyers and
sellers to act more intelligently.
Austin, supra note 25, at 1329 n.33 (citing F. CASE, REAL ESTATE 376-77 (1962)).
134. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
135. Austin, supra note 25, at 1329. Austin asserts that by virtue of the benefits
of multiple listing, real estate becomes a more liquid commodity.
136. See Matin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 937-38, 549 P.2d
833, 843-44, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11-12 (1976). In Palsson, an incorporated association of
real estate brokers sought declaratory relief adjudging that its action in denying
membrship to a part-time broker was a valid exclusion. The court held that al-
though the board's practices were not unlawful, per se, such actions were in viola-
tion of the Cartwright Act pursuant to the "rule of reason." See notes 141, 148, 151
& 152 infra.
In reaching its decision, the court recognized the infeasibility of admitting all ap-
plicants as members. "[An] association cannot continue to exist if its activities
are completely and unconditionally open to outside participation. It is only
through its activities that an association attracts and holds membership." Bodnor,
Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership & Participation, 54 AM.
B.A.J. 27, 32 (1968). But, exclusions that unreasonably exclude must be scruti-
nized for their detrimental affect on free trade.
137. 16 Cal. 3d at 938, 549 P.2d at 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
138. Thus, the court must look at the reasonableness of the board's practices.
See note 141, 148 & 154 infra; see also 108 & 109 supra and text accompanying
notes.
139. A group boycott may include a concerted refusal by a group of traders to
deal with other traders in order to achieve some internal or external advantages.
See Klor's v. Broadway-Hales Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959), where a group
boycott of a retailer by another retailer, manufacturer and distributor was held to
sufficiently affect the natural flow of intrastate commerce to allow a claim for
treble damages under the Sherman Act.
The elements for finding a group boycott include both concert of action and com-
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reasonable restraint of trade.1 40 The crucial inquiry into board
membership standards is the reasonableness of the exclusion, the
finding of which will depend on balancing the character and ex-
tent of the benefits that accrue to members against the corre-
sponding disadvantages to nonmembers and the industry as a
whole. 14 1
The balancing of economic advantages and disadvantages as a
standard in determining the reasonableness of membership ex-
clusions is set forth in Associated Press v. United States. 42 In As-
sociated Press, the bylaws of a co-operative news-gathering
association with strict membership requirements prohibited
members from providing news to nonmembers. In holding that
the bylaws constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade,143 the
United States Supreme Court found that the economic disadvan-
tages of exclusion restrained competition.144 "[E ]xclusion result-
ing in the reduction of competitive opportunities [were] deemed
bination for anticompetitive purposes. See, e.g., General Chem., Inc. v. Exxon
Chem. Co., USA, 625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1980), where a seller of polyethylene scrap
was free to sell to whomever it chose so long as it was not motivated by anticom-
petitive purpose; United States v. Independent Gasoline Marketers of America, 624
F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1980), where a combination of gasoline distributors formed for
the purpose of, and with the effect of fixing gasoline prices was found to be illegal
per se; Sierra Wine and Liquor Co. v. Hueblein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1980),
where the unilateral act of a wine manufacturer in terminating a distributorship
agreement was not found to be a violation of the Sherman Act; Morse v. Swank,
Inc., 493 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where a refusal to allow plaintiff to market
defendant's cigarette lighters had to have had an anticompetitive effect on the in-
dustry in order to constitute a violation of the Sherman Act; Tim W. Koerner &
Assoc., Inc. v. Aspen Labs, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Tex. 1980), where the refusal
to deal without unreasonable restraint was not held to be a Sherman Act violation.
140. See notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text.
141. This is commonly referred to as the "rule of reason." In Palsson, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court looked to the case of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918), and noted that one "must analyze the economic effects of the
board's practices and then consider possible justifications for the practice." Pal-
sson, 16 Cal. 3d at 935-36, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10. See also, Penne v.
Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1979). Although
real estate information exchanges were not held to be illegal per se, their ultimate
legallity depended on their effects upon competition.
142. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
143. The Court upheld the lower court's decision that the Associated Press by-
laws were, on their face, restraints of trade without regard to proven past effects.
The majority opinion noted that "[ciombinations are no less lawful because they
have not as yet resulted in restraint. An agreement or combination to follow a
course of conduct which will necessarily restrain or monopolize a part of trade or
commerce may violate the Sherman Act .... Id. at 12.
144. The Court noted that although one individual may decide whether, and to
whom, to sell or not to sell, the Sherman Act contemplates illegal associations that
sufficiently critical"145 to warrant a balance in favor of nonmem-
bers. Thus, when membership standards operate to exclude com-
petitors and have the effect of reducing competitive opportunities
to the economic disadvantage of nonmembers, the standards and
exclusions may be found to be unreasonable restraints of trade. 46
It has been established that voluntary business organizations
may lawfully adopt reasonable membership standards and there-
after restrict benefits and advantages solely to members without
engaging in a boycott. 147 Further, where agreements made among
real estate association participants are reasonably related to legit-
imate associational purposes, such as providing services to mem-
bers and improving standards of practice, such agreements are
lawful unless they substantially and directly restrain trade.148
seek to destroy business rivals as a means of furthering the interests of its mem-
bers. Such an objective may not justify the resulting harm. Id. at 15.
145. Austin, supra note 25, at 1343 (emphasis added). The author also notes the
analogous facts to the multilisting situation. In both the bylaws of the Associated
Press and those of MLS, harsh sanctions are imposed for selling listings or news
to nonassociation members. Id.
146. See, e.g., Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1977). The court held that in order to survive the challenge of the Sherman Act, a
particular practice, rule or regulation of an association must serve the purpose for
which the association exists, i.e., to improve its efficiency and service to the public.
Those regulations which only serve to suppress competition between members
and nonmembers will not withstand the challenge. United States v. National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs, 533 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court of appeals held that
a rule which prohibited any competitive bidding by professional engineers was il-
legal as a violation of the Sherman Act without regard to any potential or asserted
benefits which might accrue from the rule. See also Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (strict rules prohibiting the sale of news to nonmembers
held to be unreasonable).
147. [1977-11 Trade Cases 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977). See United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 11978-11 Trade Cases 62,091 (M.D. Ga. 1978). The district court
found requirements for membership, which included a sound credit rating and
good business reputation, purchase of $1000 share, an open office, and active busi-
ness during normal hours, to be reasonable. Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Real-
tors, [1977-1] Trade Cases 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977). Since the broker assumes
responsibility for the action of other members in the operation of the multiple list-
ing service, the exclusion of the plaintiff was reasonable where the board deter-
mined he had not obtained a favorable busines reputation in the community. See
also notes 21-23 and 116 supra and accompanying text.
148. The Indianapolis Board of Realtors had an 8-point membership test. The
criteria were as follows:
1.) A valid real estate license (and actually engaged in the real estate
business and its recognized branches).
2.) A place of business within board jurisdiction.
3.) A place of business in compliance with local zoning regulations.
4.) A favorable business reputation in the community.
5.) A sound credit rating.
6.) Completed the board indoctrination course.
7.) Signified his intention to abide by the National Association of Real-
tors Code of Ethics.
8.) Signified his intention to abide by the Constitution, Bylaws, Policy,
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In Matin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson,149 a licensed
real estate salesman was denied membership in a local real estate
boardt 50 because, as a part-time salesman, he did not meet the
board's membership requirement that applicants be "primarily
engaged in the real estate business."151 Denial of membership
also precluded access to the board's MLS. The provision was en-
forced by a prohibition against members sharing offices with or
employing a person who had been denied board membership. 5 2
The court held that voluntary associations have a right to
choose their own members and cannot be required to open mem-
bership to every applicant. However, the court found that mem-
bership in the board in question was a matter of economic
necessity and survival to those engaged in the sale of real es-
tate.153 Because of the economic necessity of membership, the
and Rules and Regulations of the local Board, the state association, and
the National Association of Realtors.
[1977-1] Trade Cases 61,435 at 71,612. In balancing the interests between poten-
tial restraint on competition and the benefit of the 8-point test, the court con-
cluded the test was reasonable since "such standards are in the public interest
and should, [therefore,] be encouraged, [rather than] sanctioned." Id. at 71,613.
The court noted that the Board did not attempt to directly or indirectly dictate
the individuals with whom its members may deal; therefore, the potential for un-
reasonable restraint upon trade is minimal. Id. In order to further its goals and
protect its members, the court held the 8-point test to be reasonably related to the
Board's purpose without unduly harming nonmember competition. Id. at 71,614.
149. 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976). See also notes 69-70
supra and accompanying text.
150. The Matin County Board of Realtors was an incorporated association affili-
ated with the California Real Estate Association and the NAR. Seventy-five per-
cent of the residential real property brokers in Marin County were members of the
board. 16 Cal. 3d at 924, 549 P.2d at 834, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
151. Id. at 924, 549 P.2d at 835, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 3. The "primarily engaged" stan-
dard was demonstrated to pose a serious anticompetitive danger and therefore vi-
olated California's Cartwright Act, sections 16700-58 of the California Business and
Professions Code. See also note 4 supra. In applying the reasonable test, the
court found that the defendant board had failed to show "that the 'primarily en-
gaged' rule facilitated an increase in professional or ethical competence in all or
most cases." 16 Cal. 3d at 939-40, 549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13. It was also
noted that the need for the rule was minimal due to the extensive state regulation
of the real estated business. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10150.6 (West Supp.
1981) which provides for eligibility for real estate broker status after having been
actively, but not primarily, engaged in the business for two years. The rule was
also viewed as overly broad since it encompassed individuals who espoused all the
desirable traits of a real estate broker yet pursued them on a part-time basis. 16
Cal. 3d at 940, 549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
152. 16 Cal. 3d at 924, 549 P.2d at 834, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 2. Unlike the regulations
in Brown, the Marin County Board sought to prescribe the extent to which mem-
bers could affiliate or deal with nonmembers. See note 148 supra.
153. 16 Cal. 3d at 938, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (emphasis added).
court decided that the reasonableness of the "primarily engaged"
rule must be subject to judicial review1 54 since it had great impact
upon the industry as a whole.
Addressing itself to the type of standards which are reasonable,
the court set forth the test to be applied when membership stan-
dards are found to pose serious anticompetitive dangers. First, it
must be demonstrated that the anticompetitive practice relates to
a legitimate purpose. Second, the practice must be reasonably
necessary to accomplish that purpose and narrowly tailored to do
S0.155
In Palsson, the board claimed that the purpose of the rule was
to "further the professional and ethical competence of the real es-
tate profession."156 However, as legitimate as this purpose may
have been, the court found it to be overbroad; hence, it did not
satisfy the second part of the test. The necessity for the rule was
minimal due to extensive state regulation of the real estate indus-
try.15 7 Additionally, the board failed to meet the burden of prov-
ing that the rule facilitated the improvement of professional and
ethical competence.' 58 Therefore, if the board had truly desired
to promote its stated goals, it would have to narrowly construe
and direct membership standards toward the accomplishment of
those goals.15 9 Only in this way would the anticompetitive effects
be minimized.
In United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc. ,160 membership rules
154. 16 Cal. 3d at 938, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12. Relying on Penshe v.
Pacific Coast Sec. of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 165, 460 P.2d 495, 498, 81 Cal. Rptr.
623, 626 (1969), the court stated "[t] he economic benefits of membership mandate
that exclusion be subject to judicial review." The court went on to note that the
availability of judicial review does not require the board to refrain from establish-
ing reasonable standards for admission. But the type of standard for admission
into membership must be rationally related to legitimate association purposes and
be fairly and rationally applied in order to satisfy the "rule of reason." 16 Cal. 3d
at 938, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
155. 16 Cal. 3d at 939, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12. In Union Circulation
Co. v. Federal Trade Com'n, 214 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1957), the court held that an
agreement not to hire salesmen who had been employed by another agency during
the past year went beyond what was necessary to curtail and eliminate fraudulent
practices.
156. 16 Cal. 3d at 939, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13. The board felt that
this would make for better educated salesmen who could devote more time to
their clients.
157. Id. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10130-183 (West 1964). In particular,
§ 10150.6 requires that a real estate salesmen can become a broker only after hav-
ing been actively engaged in the business of a real estate salesman for at least two
years.
158. 16 Cal. 3d at 939-40, 549 P.2d at 8445, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13. The court observed
that a part-time salesman might have a smaller clientele and, hence, be able to
devote more time to self-improvement or in aiding his clients.
159. Id. at 940, 549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
160. [1978-1] Trade Cases 62,091 (M.D. Ga. 1978). In Realty Multi-List, an in-
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requiring the purchase of a membership share and the mainte-
nance of an active real estate business through an office open dur-
ing normal business hours have also been upheld as reasonable.
The required purchase of a $1000 membership share was found to
be reasonable on several grounds. First, membership in the serv-
ice was found to be a thing of value because of the benefits accru-
ing to members. Secondly, the requirement was reasonable in
that present members had already contributed the same amount
of money or more to establish and maintain the service. Thirdly,
since the purchase required was that of a share of stock in the
service, members would be entitled to equal distribution of the
assets of the service in the event of dissolution. Finally, it was
found that the cost of the share was reasonable when balanced
against the benefits afforded by membership. 161
As to the requirement that a member have an active business
and maintain an office open during normal hours, the court found
this to be "reasonably related to the purposes for which the or-
ganization exists." 162 The objective of the organization was to
pool information regarding property listings and furnish such list-
ings to persons who were readily available for contact and negoti-
ation. It was reasoned that if everyone holding a broker's license
dependent listing service was charged with engaging in a continuing conspiracy to
restrict membership and restrain competition among real estate brokers. The or-
ganization maintained standards requiring the purchase of one share of stock for
$1000 and required applicants to have a favorable business reputation, be actively
engaged in the real estate business, and maintain an office open during normal
business hours.
The plaintiff sought a civil injunction against the defendant under section 4 of
the Sherman Act (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976)). The allegation was that
the defendant had combined and conspired with other persons, firms, and corpora-
tions, including their own members and officers, in an unreasonable restraint of
trade and commerce under section 1 of the Sherman Act (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976)). The district court subsequently granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
161. [1978-11 Trade Cases 62,091 at 74,756. The court further pointed out that
"such a charge would [hardly] be a serious impediment for any broker actively
engaged in the real estate business in this area." Id. The court's reasoning ap-
pears to have been based upon the principle that the regulation was reasonable
and directed toward a legitimate board purpose in protecting those who had al-
ready joined the board. Furthermore, such a regulation was not so onerous so as
to prevent anyone who wished to join the board, thereby negating any anticompe-
titive tendencies of the regulation.
162. Id. at 74,757. The organization existed to serve those who were members
and their clients. If part-time brokers who would be difficult to reach and might
contribute little or nothing to the service were allowed to join, the purpose and
very existence of the organization would be threatened.
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was permitted to belong to the organization, a strong possibility
would exist that those persons not meeting the above require-
ments would not furnish any listings to the service or be available
for contact and negotiation. As the court indicated, such a situa-
tion would destroy the efficiency, effectiveness, and usefulness of
the organization.163
The court additionally concluded that the allegation that the or-
ganization was engaged in a group boycott was unjustified be-
cause there was not evidence that the defendant had ever sought
to restrict the freedom of any member to engage in co-operative
sales with nonmembers.16 4 Therefore, unlike Palsson, the danger
of anticompetitive effects was not present, and consequently, the
membership requirements were deemed necessary and suffi-
ciently narrow to accomplish the organization's legitimate pur-
poses.165
The issue of board membership policies and standards as group
boycotts may appear to have been resolved at both the state and
federal levels as demonstrated in Brown, Palsson, and Realty
Multi-List. However, this conclusion is dubious in light of the dis-
missal of several actions, which alleged group boycotts by real es-
tate boards, for lack of jurisdiction. 166
Furthermore, there has been a long-established judicial disincli-
nation to meddle in the internal affairs of private voluntary as-
sociations.167 It is also difficult to discover evidence which
163. Id. The court appears to have based its determination on the reasonable-
ness of the regulation and the legitimacy of its purpose. The court also believed
that no substantial burden would be placed on anyone as a result of the regula-
tion.
164. Id. The absence of such evidence apparently convinced the court that the
board had refrained from instituting any anticompetitive practices against non-
members in the past.
165. In concluding, the court stated that a decree ordering the defendant to
open its membership to any person holding a broker's license was not necessary
in either the public interest or for the protection of an individual. This determina-
tion was based upon evidence showing that every active broker with an office in
/the county was a member of the defendant organization. Furthermore, the only
applicant denied membership in the preceeding three years was excluded for good
cause, as even the excluded applicant recognized. [1978-1] Trade Cases 62,091 at
74,758. The court also believed that such a decree would serve no purpose other
than to put the defendant "in an operational strait jacket and keep it under judi-
cial supervision for years to come." Id.
166. For a review of jurisdictional issues in this context, see notes 42-104 supra
and accompanying text.
167. This disinclination is attributed to the difficulty in interpreting obscure as-
sociation rules and procedures, the resentment that judicial interference would
likely cause, and the belief that constant judicial supervision would deter the
growth of many types of organizations that are beneficial to society. Note, Expul-
sion and Exclusion from Hospital Practice and Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L.
REv. 327, 329 (1961). See also, Note, Exclusion From Private Associations, 74 YALE
L.J. 1313, 1314 (1965). Judicial reluctance to interfere is more pronounced where
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demonstrates that real estate boards seek to restrict the freedom
of members to engage in business with nonmembers. As evi-
denced in Brown, Palsson, and Realty Multi-List, board regula-
tions are usually found to be justified by legitimate purposes.
Additionally, local boards affiliated with the NAR are expected to
adhere to that organization's requirement that the "8-Point Mem-
bership Criteria"168 be the maximum standards for acceptance
into board membership. The NAR has also adopted a policy of
encouraging cooperation among members and nonmembers. 169
The preceding factors make it difficult to establish the existence
of a group boycott by local boards.
However, if the finding of federal jurisdiction under the Sher-
man Act in the McLain decisionl70 increases the number of anti-
trust actions involving the real estate industry, boards excluding
qualified applicants from membership or prohibiting co-operation
among members and nonmembers will be subject to close scru-
tiny under the antitrust laws.
In light of McLain and the decisions in Brown, Palsson, and Re-
alty Multi-List, it is possible that violations of federal antitrust
laws will be found under certain circumstances. Such violations
might result if a board were to exclude applicants based upon
board membership standards which economically and competi-
tively disadvantage nonmembers, and which are not reasonably
related to and necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate
board purposes.1 71
2. Scheduling of Commission Fees as Price-Fixing
In United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards,172 the Supreme Court established that the scheduling or
maintenance of standard rates of commissions by real estate
boards was per se an unreasonable restraint of trade. 173 In that
case, the Washington Real Estate Board set standard rates of
the association's decision making process deals with specialized knowledge. Hig-
gins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 202, 238 A.2d 665, 671
(1968).
168. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text.
169. MLS Handbook, supra note 29, at 16.
170. See notes 77-104 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 149-65 supra and accompanying text.
172. 339 U.S. 485 (1950). See also notes 42-45 & 48-49 supra and accompanying
text.
173. 339 U.S. at 489.
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commissions to be charged by its members and adopted a provi-
sion of its code of ethics which read in part: "Brokers should
maintain the standard rates of commission adopted by the board
and no business should be solicited at lower rates."174 Members
of the Washington board agreed to adhere to the code, thereby
agreeing to the maintenance of the price schedule.
Justice Douglas, in writing the majority opinion, declined to
consider whether or not the schedule of rates in question served
an honorable or worthy end. Price-fixing is per se an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade and all that is needed to prove price-fixing is
"[a] n agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule
or by proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum
price .... -"175 The fact that no sanctions were imposed for depar-
ture from the price schedule was deemed to be immateriall 76
There can be no doubt that the per se rule against price-fixing is
the most absolute in antitrust law.177 But despite this absolute
ban and the unavailability of defenses for engaging in such con-
duct, plaintiffs alleging price-fixing among realtors have encoun-
tered substantial difficulties of proof,178 as well as the
jurisdictional hurdles presented prior to McLain.
The problems confronted in sustaining the burden of proof in
real estate price-fixing cases is perhaps best demonstrated by an
examination of two decisions addressing the issue. In Murphy v.
Alpha Realty, Inc. ,179 certain real estate salesmen alleged that the
defendant realty association had conspired to fix broker's com-
missions in the sale of residential real property. The district court
found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proof in
showing that the defendants had engaged in conduct constituting
an unreasonable restraint of trade or that such conduct injured
plaintiffs. In so holding, the court ruled that price parallelism ex-
hibited by a substantial uniformity in broker commission rates,
combined with other circumstantial evidence,180 was insufficient
174. Id. at 488. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 218
(1946); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1948).
175. 339 U.S. at 489.
176. Id. See Federal Trade Com'n v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n., 273 U.S.
52, 62 (1927); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411
(1921); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1914).
177. Austin, note 25 supra, at 1339.
178. See, e.g., In Re Montgomery Real Estate Antitrust Litigation, 11979-2]
Trade Cases 62,860 (D.Md. 1979); Murphy v. Alpha Realty, Inc., [1978-2] Trade
Cases 62,388 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
179. [1978-21 Trade Cases 62,388 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
180. See text accompanying note 186 infra. The circumstantial evidence found
insufficient to support the allegation consisted of the prior existence of a recom-
mended fee schedule, brokers' exchange of price and commission information, dis-
crimination against brokers charging less than a 7% commission rate through
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to prove the existence of an agreement or mutual consent to fix
prices in violation of the Sherman Act.181
In Murphy, the plaintiffs failed to show any connection between
what the court believed to be individual policies and practices of
the defendant brokers and the alleged concert of action. The
court further ruled that the plaintiffs had not produced any evi-
dence proving that the alleged practices caused any injury to
their business or property.182 Consequently, the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted.' 83
In the case of In Re Montgomery Real Estate Antitrust Litiga-
tion,184 a somewhat unconventional settlement agreement be-
tween real estate brokers, held liable for price-fixing, and private
litigantsI85 was certified as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The
settlement consisted of an agreement which provided that "for
each property qualifying its seller for class membership," a certifi-
cate 86 would be issued entitling the holder to list the property
with defendant brokers and willing nondefendant brokers at a
cut-rate five percent brokerage fee.187 The plan also provided that
holders of such certificates were entitled to sell their rights
through a clearinghouse established by the defendants.188 The
settlement was approved over the objections of a group of twenty-
eight brokers who petitioned jointly to argue that the settlement
reciprocity policies among brokers, advertising restrictions, exclusion of competi-
tors, and other limitations on the competetive activities of brokers. [1978-21 Trade
Cases 62,388 at 76,310. The "other alleged limitations on the competitive activi-
ties of brokers" included the imposition of "anticompetitive restrictions prohibit-
ing members from: (1) soliciting listings or sales personnel from other MLS
members; (2) advertising listings without the permission of the listing broker;(3) presenting offers to the seller only through the listing broker." Id. at 76, 314.
181. [1978-21 Trade Cases 62,388 at 76,310.
182. Id. at 76,316.
183. Id.
184. [1979-2] Trade Cases 62,860 (D.Md. 1979).
185. The private litigants consisted of a class of
all persons who have sold used residential real estate in Montgomery
County, in whole or in part through the services of the defendants from
September 1, 1974 through September 30, 1976 and who entered into bro-
kerage agreements with any of defendants wherein they agreed and did
pay a brokerage fee of 7% in connection with the sale of such used resi-
dential real estate.
Id. at 78,975.
186. "The certificates were to be negotiable in two successive assignees and to
remain valid until December 31, 1985." [1979-2] Trade Cases 62,860 at 78,976.
187. [1979-2] Trade Cases 62,860 at 78,976.
188. Id. Under the settlement, the clearinghouse was to advertise on a regular
basis and distribute a list of all certificate holders wishing to sell. Id.
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plan would guarantee the business of the plaintiffs or their as-
signees to the defendants.189 Additionally, the group claimed that
the settlement plan would have the effect of stabilizing brokerage
commission rates at five percent.190
Despite argument from nonparty brokers that the plan would
have an anticompetitive effect on the real estate market,191 the
court certified the settlement because brokers remained free to
negotiate rates and the plan could only affect ten percent of the
market.192 In considering the strength of the plaintiffs' case, the
court believed the settlement to be preferable to proceeding to
trial in light of the difculties of proof of causation and injury
that the plaintiffs would encounter193 and the substantial de-
fenses 9 4 available to the defendants.19 5
As demonstrated by Murphy and Montgomery Real Estate, the
burden of proving price-fixing in real estate brokerage cases is not
as easily achieved as the decision in the leading case of United
States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards'96 would
tend to indicate. It is readily apparent that, absent substantial
and concrete proof of agreement, causation, and injury, plaintiffs
who allege price-fixing among real estate brokers are likely to en-
counter material difficulties in sustaining the burden of proof re-
quired by antitrust laws.
B. MLS as Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
Where the likelihood of economic and competitive disadvantage
would result from a denial of access to MLS, such denial should
raise a prima facie case of an unreasonable restraint of trade.197
But as previously noted,198 the holdings of cases addressing the
189. Id. at 78,977.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 78,982.
192. Id.
193. Although the court believed that the plaintiffs could prove a prima facie
case, "it would be extremely difficult to establish the necessary proof' of injury.
Id. at 78,980.
194. One such possible defense would be that consumers who do not allege
commercial or competitive injury have no standing to invoke section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act providing for treble damages because they have not been "injured in
[their] business or property." [1979-2] Trade Cases 62,860 at 78,980 n.11 (citing 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
195. The court also took into consideration the cost of additional litigation and
the defendants' inability to satisfy a cash judgment. Id. The estimated amount of
treble damages, with costs and fees, was $5 million. The court determined,
through examination of the defendants' financial reports, that the defendants
would be unable to provide a cash settlement or satisfy a money judgment. Id.
196. See note 170 supra and text accompanying.
197. Austin, note 25 supra, at 1346.
198. See note 125 supra and text accompanying.
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issue of MLS access are in "hopeless disarray."199
Competitive effectiveness appears to be the determining factor
in decisions requiring that MLS facilities be made available to
nonmembers. 20 0 As early as 1966, in Grillo v. Board of Realtors of
Plainfield Area,201 a New Jersey court required that MLS facili-
ties be made available to a licensed broker who had repeatedly
been rejected from board membership. The court emphasized
that denial of access to listings would disadvantage nonmember
brokers by reducing the "opportunity to buy or sell things in
which the two groups compete."20 2 This position was supported
by the California Supreme Court in a decision holding that access
to MLS information is so essential in enabling brokers to compete
effectively that access must be granted to all licensed brokers.203
In 1980, a New Jersey court held that the "relevant test for an an-
titrust violation [in the real estate industry] is whether or not a
broker without access to multiple listing(s) can successfully com-
pete with those who do have access." 20 4
In contrast, several courts have upheld exclusions from MLS
participation based upon findings of the reasonableness of the ex-
199. See note 125 supra.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1978-11 Trade Cases
62,091 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Martin-Trigona v. National Ass'n of Realtors, [1978-1] Trade
Cases 61,915 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, [1977-1] Trade
Cases 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977); State of Iowa ex. rel. Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real
Estate Bd., [1980-1] Trade Cases 63,012 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1980); Glendale Bd. of
Realtors v. Hounsell, 72 Cal. App. 3d 210, 139 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1977); Pomanowski v.
Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 175 N.J. Super. 212, 417 A.2d 1119 (1977); Matin
County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1976); Grillo v. Bd. of Realtors of Plainfield Area, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635
(1966).
201. 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (1966).
202. Id. at 222, 219 A.2d at 646.
203. Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 939, 549 P.2d
833, 842 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 (1976). The California Supreme Court held that while
denial of MLS access to nonmembers by a board was not unlawful per se, this par-
ticular exclusion was not supported by the proper objective of furthering profes-
sional and ethical competence of the real estate profession. See notes 149-59 supra
and accompanying text. Another similar California case held that a board of real-
tors had violated California's antitrust law since it had denied access to nonmem-
bers and it appeared that the nonmembers could not compete effectively with
board members who had access to the MLS. Glendale Bd. of Realtors v. Hounsell,
72 Cal. App. 3d 210, 139 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1977).
204. Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Board of Realtors, 175 NJ. Super. 212,
217, 417 A.2d 1119, 1124 (1980). The Pomanowski court found that denial of access
to the MLS by board nonmembers was not justified by a nexus between the board
members and the MLS.
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clusion. In Brown v. Indianapolis Board of Realtors,205 a defend-
ant board of realtors was permitted to restrict its membership
and MLS participation to those realtors meeting the board's mem-
bership standards, provided the standards were reasonable. In
Brown, the board refused MLS access to the plaintiff-broker be-
cause he had not attained the required "favorable business repu-
tation in the community."206 The court reasoned that since
members of the board assumed responsibility for the actions of
other members, the reasonable membership requirements were
clearly warranted. 207
Relying upon Brown, the court in Martin-Trigona v. National
Association of Realtors208 held that members of real estate
boards may properly exclude nonmembers from participation in
their activities because such boards are classified as voluntary
trade associations. 209
Other courts have extended the rights of real estate boards to
exclude nonmembers from participation. 2 10 The "8 - Point Mem-
bership Criteria," as promulgated by the NAR, has recently been
found to be a "free ... open and nondiscriminatory" standard in
determining eligibility for board membership. 21 1
The decisions addressing MLS access by nonmembers of real
estate boards at both state and federal levels leave unanswered
the critical question of whether such exclusions constitute unrea-
sonable restraints of trade. Some courts consider the effect on
competition to be the determining factor in examining denials of
205. [1977-1] Trade Cases 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
206. Id. at 71,611.
207. Id. The court found that the defendant board had utilized reasonable
membership standards in processing applications of the plaintiff, and that based
upon information it had received, the plaintiff was properly excluded from board
membership due to a failure to obtain a favorable business reputation within the
community. The court also refused to substitute its judgment for that of the mem-
bership committee of the board.
208. [1978-1] Trade Cases 61,915 (E.D. Ill. 1978).
209. Id. The court determined that since the realtor board was a voluntary
trade association, membership exclusions would not offend antitrust laws. Other
counts alleging antitrust violations against the defendants were found to be ram-
bling, incoherent, and scandalous.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1978-11 Trade Cases
62,091 (M.D. Ga. 1977). See also notes 160-65 supra and accompanying text. In Re-
alty Multi-List, a $1,000 membership fee was found to be a thing of value which
would entitle purchasers to equal distribution of the organization's assets in the
event of dissolution.
211. State of Iowa ex. rel. Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real Estate Bd., [1980-11
Trade Cases 63,012 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1980). Board membership criteria and MLS
participation were found to be free and open, and to promote professionalism and
competition. The court found the public to be the ultimate beneficiary of the
board's operations.
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MLS privileges to nonmembers,2 12 while other courts look to the
reasonableness of the exclusion. 213 The jurisdictional differences
in approaching MLS access issues indicate the need for the appli-
cation of a uniform test. The appropriateness of applying a uni-
form test is best demonstrated in a statement of the Attorney
General of the State of North Carolina which utilizes both the ef-
fect on competition factor and the reasonableness of the exclu-
sion factor.
In analyzing requirements for participation in a multiple listing service,
each case must be decided on its own facts. The competitive advantage of
multiple listing service participation in the particular real estate market
involved must be considered in light of the reasonableness of the require-
ments for participation and the extent to which such requirements restrict
membership in the multiple listing service. Where the multiple listing
service is operated as an adjunct of a local Board of Realtors, either as a
separate corporation or as a committee of the Board, and where member-
ship in the Board is available on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,
there is no unreasonable restraint of trade.214
Thus, an appropriate test to be utilized in analysis of cases in-
volving access to MLS information could be formulated to mini-
mize the diversified jurisdictional approaches to such issues.
Because an increase in federal antitrust litigation involving real
estate brokers and MLS access can be expected as a result of the
McLain decision,2 15 the development and application of a uni-
form test in such cases is highly desirable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Real estate boards and their ancillary services, especially the
MLS, are of vital importance to society and the industry they
serve. The powers and activities of real estate boards and their
members exert significant influence upon the housing market.2 16
However, the power to influence also carries with it the possibility
of resulting violations of federal and state antitrust laws. While
many practices and activities of real estate boards first appear to
operate in violation of antitrust laws, such activities are often
found to be reasonable restraints of trade.
The fact that many antitrust issues inherent in the real estate
industry have not been addressed or resolved reflects judicial re-
212. See notes 188-92 supra and accompanying text.
213. See notes 193-98 supra and accompanying text.
214. Op. Atty. Gen. of North Carolina [1980-1] Trade Cases 63,216 (1980).
215. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
216. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
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luctance to exert jurisdiction over real estate boards when the de-
fense of lack of interstate commerce in real estate sales is
raised.21 7 Perhaps the redefinition of the bases of federal jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act in real estate cases, as set forth in
McLain,2 18 offers a solution. Given the significance of the real es-
tate industry in modern society, and the breadth and objectives of
antitrust laws to assure a competitive economy, judicial review
necessarily must play in increasing role in the extent to which
protection of procompetitive activities must yield to the protec-
tion of consumers.
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217. See notes 71-104 supra and accompanying text.
218. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
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